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IN DEFENCE OF SUBSIDIARITY 
© George MacDonald Ross, 1993 
Philosophy Now, No. 6, 1993 
In issue No. 5 (Spring 1993), there were two rather flippant remarks about the concept 
of subsidiarity. The Philosophy Glossary defined subsidiarity as ‘nobody agrees on 
what this word means’ (p.32), and John Crosthwaite described its meaning as a ‘grey 
area’, and ‘hand[ed] the question over to the real philosophers’ (p.25). 
I don’t know if I count as a ‘real’ philosopher, since I have some unsound views on 
the theory of meaning. In particular, I believe that the meaning of a word depends as 
much on its etymology as on its use. We can often gain important philosophical 
insights through understanding how words have acquired their present meaning. 
The abstract noun subsidiarity comes from the adjective subsidiary, which in turn 
comes from the concrete noun subsidy. The English word subsidy is a direct 
borrowing of the Latin subsidium, meaning ‘support’ or ‘assistance’ (though it has 
subsequently been confined to a financial sense); and the adjective subsidiary 
originally meant ‘providing assistance’ or ‘supportive’; but it gradually changed its 
meaning, via ‘auxiliary’ or ‘tributary’, to ‘subordinate’. 
The change in meaning of the word subsidiary can cause difficulties for speakers of 
modern English, since one might expect subsidiarity to mean ‘the quality of being 
subordinate’. This is perhaps why The Times of 18.9.82 described ‘the principle of 
subsidiarity’ as ‘a meaningless or even misleading phrase in English’, since it would 
seem nonsense to describe a body high in the hierarchy as ‘subsidiary’ to a 
subordinate body. But the second edition of the Oxford English Dictionary (yes, you 
will find the word if you look it up) records no use of the word to mean ‘the quality of 
being subordinate’. Its only meaning is ‘the quality of being subsidiary’, in the 
original sense of ‘supportive’; and this is broadly the sense in which it is used by 
Eurocrats. But where did they get it from? 
The Economist of 9.12.89 was right to trace it to Pope Pius XI. In 1931, Pius 
published an encyclical on the social order, called ‘On the Fortieth Year’ (since it was 
issued on the 40th anniversary of Leo XIII’s encyclical ‘Of New Things’). The 
context is interesting: a treatise on political philosophy written by the head of the 
Vatican State, which had been set up only two years before in the capital of Fascist 
Italy. 
Pius writes as follows (I paraphrase slightly, since his convoluted Latin doesn’t go 
easily into English): 
§79. It is a fact of historical evolution that many things which could 
previously be achieved by small social units can now be achieved only 
by larger ones. However, there remains a fundamental and immutable 
principle of social philosophy which cannot be affected by historical 
change. This is that it is quite wrong for things which can be done by 
individuals through their own efforts to be taken away from them and 
devolved to the community. It is equally intolerable and unjust for 
responsibility for what can be achieved by smaller and subordinate 
communities to be taken over by larger and higher-level social units. 
Every agency in society ought to use its special powers to give support 
[‘subsidy’] to the members of the social body, and never to destroy or 
absorb them. 
§80. So the highest authority in the state should not be distracted by 
matters of lesser importance, but should leave them to groupings lower 
down the hierarchy. It will carry out its business more freely, more 
decisively and more effectively, by limiting itself to what it alone can 
achieve — providing a sense of direction, exercising vigilance, giving 
encouragement, and imposing constraints, as circumstances require. 
Those at the top should bear in mind that the happiness and prosperity 
of the state depends on the quality of relations between social 
institutions at different levels, which itself depends on observing the 
above principle of the ‘subsidiary’ [supportive] role [of the higher-
level institution]. 
In fact Pius himself doesn’t use the noun subsidiaritas, though he is sufficiently 
conscious that he is coining a new sense of the adjective subsidiarius to put it in 
quotes. The noun first appears (as Subsidiarität) in a German translation of the 
encyclical published the same year; similarly with the French subsidiarité. The first 
occurrence of subsidiarity in English is in 1936, in a translation by B.W. Dempsey of 
a German work on political economy, which discussed Pius’s principle. 
The OED definition of the principle is: 
that a central authority should have a subsidiary function, performing 
only those tasks which cannot be performed effectively at a more 
immediate or local level.  
It seems very close to the Maastricht definition in Article 3.b., quoted by John 
Crosthwaite: 
The Community shall act within the limit of the powers conferred upon 
it by this treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas 
which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community 
shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only 
if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by 
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved 
by the Community. Any action by the Community shall not go beyond 
what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty. 
However, there is an important difference in emphasis between these two definitions, 
and Pius’s original conception. For Pius, the sole raison d’être of a higher-level or 
central institution is to support and serve the interests of lower-level institutions. He 
sees the state as an organic whole (the ‘social body’), in which the whole, as 
represented by the highest authority, is as concerned for the welfare of the parts, as the 
parts are expected to be concerned for the welfare of the whole. The principle of 
subsidiarity is positive and universal. 
By contrast, the Maastricht definition is negative and limited in scope. It applies only 
to areas of potential communal action where sovereignty has not already been 
surrendered by member states, and it is concerned only with putting some limit on the 
amount of additional powers which can be usurped by the central authority, and not 
with how they should be exercised. Again, the approach is atomistic rather than 
holistic: there are discrete member-states, discrete central institutions, and discrete 
powers; and the argument is over which bodies should have complete possession of 
which powers. 
Curiously, the Pope’s thinking seems much more in line with current management 
theory, which tends to replace top-down power relationships with structures in which 
responsibility is devolved to the lowest possible level, and management and central 
agencies play a supportive role — defining the overall mission of the organisation in 
relation to the outside world, providing information and advice about threats and 
opportunities, encouraging good practice, and monitoring performance and taking 
appropriate action where necessary. In the Pope’s own terminology, the only 
legitimate roles of higher or central agencies are the supportive roles of direction, 
vigilance, encouragement, and constraint (§80) — to which one should add his 
recognition in §79 that there are purely executive functions which it is only 
practicable to delegate to a central agency. 
Apart from a deafening silence about the place of democratic debate in defining 
organisational objectives and good practice, this strikes me as a remarkably good 
contribution to political philosophy — not least because it broadens the scope of 
political philosophy to power relations in any organisation, and not merely the nation 
state. You don’t have to be a Fascist, a Roman Catholic, or a devotee of Total Quality 
Management to appreciate that the term ‘subsidiarity’, as clearly explained by the 
Pope, enriches our political and managerial vocabulary. The drafters of the Maastricht 
Treaty may have confused matters by using the term in a more restricted sense than 
was originally intended; but they have at least fulfilled an important service by 
bringing it back into the limelight. 
There was supposed to be a national and European debate on the meaning of 
subsidiarity. What has happened to it? At least Philosophy Now is beginning to set an 
example. 
  
 
